We conducted an online survey to assess the career experiences of wrong side blocks, the practice of Stop-Before-YouBlock, the recently described method of Mock-Before-You-Block and attitudes to these. Respondents were 208 anaesthetists across nine hospitals (173 consultants or Staff and Associate Specialist doctors'), representing 3623 years of collective anaesthetic practice. There had been a total of 62 wrong side blocks (by 51 anaesthetists and one current trainee). Predisposing factors for this were commonly ascribed to distractions (35 (69%), for example due to rushing or teaching), patient positioning (9 (18%)) or miscommunication (6 (12%)). Two (4%) respondents felt they had performed StopBefore-You-Block too early; 62 (41%) of all respondents stated they performed Stop-Before-You-Block as early as preparing the skin or on arrival of the patient in the anaesthetic room, and not any later. Twenty (10%) respondents admitted to not performing Stop-Before-You-Block at all or only occasionally (including 5 (2%) who had performed a wrong side block). Mock-Before-You-Block was easily understood (by 169 out of 197 (86%)) and 14 out of 61 (23%) respondents felt it would have prevented the wrong side error in their case. However, free-text comments indicated that many anaesthetists were reluctant to use a method that interrupted their performance of the block. We conclude that considerable work is needed to achieve full compliance with Stop-Before-You-Block at the correct time.
Introduction
Stop-Before-You-Block (SBYB) is an initiative designed to eliminate wrong side regional anaesthetic block [1] . The idea is that the anaesthetist should pause, interrupting their performance of the block just before needle insertion to check the correct side. Although SBYB should prevent error, there is nothing within the original description of SBYB that actually forces the 'stop' moment; it is simply left to the anaesthetist's discretion as to how best to do so. Although a range of posters serve as aides-memoire, it can be argued that relying on these alone is akin, in driving terms, to using 'stop' signs everywhere along a road except at the crossroad junction, leaving it to the driver to remember to stop at that critical point.
Perhaps, at least in part, for this reason SBYB does not appear to have had a significant impact on reducing wrong side block. National Reporting and Learning Service (NRLS) data indicated 27-56 wrong side blocks annually between 2007 and 2010 and 45 in 2015 after SBYB was introduced [2] [3] [4] . Recently, Pandit et al. reported a novel technique of forcing the 'stop' moment termed Mock-Before-You-Block (MBYB) [5] . This exploits two key observations: that a wrong side block is immediately recognised and that an event of successive wrong side injections for the same block at the same sitting has never been reported. Mock-Before-You-Block involves the anaesthetist mocking a block (e.g. using an empty syringe) just before every needle insertion.
Although Never Events, including wrong side blocks, are carefully investigated locally [6, 7] there is no central, openly accessible repository for the details of each root cause analysis enabling wider learning across the National Health Service (NHS). We, therefore, conducted a regional survey to assess the collective experience of wrong side block across a UK region. We wished to estimate a crude incidence (e.g. by per year of anaesthetic practice), and ascertain the factors that those who had experienced wrong side block felt to have been predisposing. We wanted to explore attitudes to SBYB, and also to the recently described MBYB.
Methods
This survey was classed as an audit of practice. We sent an email to all anaesthetists in nine hospitals across the Midlands (encompassing six NHS Trusts). The email contained a link to a Survey Monkey questionnaire (Survey Monkey Inc, San Mateo, CA, USA) that asked a series of questions relating to experience (personal or witnessed) of wrong side blocks, and general questions relating to seniority (see Supporting Information, Data S1). Specifically, we asked if respondents were aware of SBYB and MBYB and if or when respondents conducted SBYB during the block performance. If they had experienced a wrong side block, we asked for their views on predisposing factors and on future preventability.
We did not plan the survey for a specific response rate. Rather, we planned for a minimum sample size of 150, and ideally at least 200 so that we could estimate appropriate Poisson confidence intervals for low or zero response rates to estimates of occurrence of wrong side blocks [8, 9] . We estimate the total population of anaesthetists targeted by the survey to be~520; the exact size and composition of the departments at any one time being difficult to ascertain given the number of unfilled posts at both senior and junior level. The questionnaire was open for 3 months, and had we not achieved our desired sample size we would have extended the survey until we had done so.
Data are presented as medians (IQR [range]) or with Poisson confidence intervals as appropriate. Data for years of experience were censored to a minimum of 1 year and maximum of 31 years (i.e. the questionnaire asked for < 1 year and > 30 years experience). There were 62 wrong side blocks reported by 51 respondents (50 seniors and one trainee). Figure 2 shows a histogram of the distribution of wrong side blocks over a career among the survey population. A first wrong side block seems most likely to occur within 10 years of anaesthesia practice (Fig. 3) , but is A wrong side block was recognised as such either immediately by 29 (57%) respondents or within minutes by 21 (41%) respondents, and only hours later by one (2%) respondent.
Results

Out
When asked about what, in their opinion, had predisposed to the wrong side block the majority of respondents cited 'distractions', including rushing or teaching (35 (69%)). One interesting cause for distraction was the presence of two ultrasound machines, one on each side of the patient. Almost a third of respondents admitted to not performing SBYB (16 (31%)) with the majority of these (11) occurring after SBYB had been introduced, indicating suboptimal uptake of this method. Moving the patient position, which distorted spatial orientation was cited by nine (18%) and misleading skin marks or miscommunication by six (12%). Examples of these included mishearing the assistant, incorrect consent forms or poorly placed surgical marks. Just two respondents (4%) felt they had performed SBYB 'too early'.
This last result was greatly at odds (and hence difficult to reconcile) with responses to the question of when anaesthetists actually undertake SBYB. Out of the 152 who responded to this question, 90 (59%) stated they performed it just before inserting the needle (i.e. at the correct time). As many as 62 (41%) undertook SBYB much earlier, for example, before cleaning the skin and preparing for the block (31 (20%)), or as early as when the patient entered the anaesthetic room (31 (20%)). Non-responders to this question included five who stated they never performed SBYB (including one who had experienced wrong side block) and 15 who only undertook it occasionally (including four who had experienced wrong side block), totalling 10% of 208 respondents. It was unclear what determined their decision to perform or not perform the SBYB.
Attitudes to measures for preventing wrong side block were explored in free-text responses. All anaesthetists were familiar with the SBYB initiative. For many respondents (135 out of 192 (70%)), remembering to perform SBYB came naturally and they felt no Number, as % of years practice Figure 3 Graph of the number of years of practice before a first wrong side block (the y-axis expressed as a % of the corresponding block in Fig. 1 ).
need for any additional prompts (notwithstanding many of these were performing SBYB too early; see above). The remainder appreciated they relied on some prompts (e.g. reminders from assistants, signs or physical barriers). Some anaesthetists had created personal methods or relied on policies introduced by their hospital (e.g. extra mark or sticker on patient or reminder on ultrasound machines). Three respondents already appeared to be using techniques very similar to MBYB (i.e. before the method was first described in the literature).
Although the first description of MBYB had been published only a month before the survey, 37 out of 197 (19%) respondents had already heard of it, and 169 (86%) felt that it was easy to understand the method. Out of the 61 cases of wrong side block, respondents felt MBYB would have prevented error in 14 cases (23%) and only in 2 (3%) cases did respondents think it would not have done so, as they would have simply forgotten to mock. The remainder (45 (74%)) were unsure. Objections to MBYB included that it was highly unusual ('mad', 'ridiculous') and that it added another layer of delay and obstruction actually to performing the block (although this last comment seemed to be at odds with the recognition that 'rushing' was a stated cause of wrong side block, see above).
Respondents were evenly divided as to whether wrong side blocks should be classed as 'Never Events' (86 (50%) said yes, 87 (50%) said no).
Discussion
There are two striking findings of this survey. First, that approximately one in four anaesthetists have performed a wrong-sided block -something classed as a 'Never Event' [6, 7] . Second, that a large proportion of anaesthetists (~41%) perform SBYB at a time-point that is much earlier than SBYB intended, to prevent wrong side block (i.e. as early as before prepping the skin or as early as arrival of patient in the anaesthetic room). After performing this 'stop' moment early, the implication of our survey results is that for many anaesthetists, the remainder of the procedure appears to be single, confluent, uninterrupted event. Yet, of those who had conducted a wrong side block, only 4% felt they had done SBYB 'too early'. Many more anaesthetists ascribed their error to 'moving the patient'. It is clear that such movement cited as a predisposing cause, is in fact irrelevant. If SBYB is performed every time just before needle insertion as it should be, it does not matter how much or how often the patient is moved because there will always be a 'stop' moment, just before needle insertion. The clear conclusion is that in the minds of far too many anaesthetists, the 'stop' moment in SBYB is simply the occasion when the operative mark and consent are checked (whenever that happens to be), and not a 'stop' or interruption to the confluent performance of the block itself. This is akin in driving, to stopping a car hundreds of yards short of a crossroad and then hurtling across without looking -then after the inevitable accident, claiming that one had duly stopped. This presumably reflects a failure in understanding of the primary purpose of SBYB. Although respondents had all heard of the initiative, 10% still reported not undertaking SBYB regularly (including not at all). This included some who have conducted a wrong side block. Since one might expect this group to be highly motivated to avoid further errors of this type, it would be important to explore more deeply their reasons for rejecting a relatively simple safety measure.
The efficacy of MBYB was predicated on two assumptions. First, that wrong side blocks are immediately recognised and second, that there has been no instance of immediately performing successive wrong side blocks of the same type. These predicates were both borne out by the survey results. Wrong side blocks were indeed invariably immediately recognised (in one instance after the needle pierced the skin, but before the local anaesthetic was injected), and no respondent in > 3000 years of collective practice had ever encountered two successive wrong side blocks during the same case. More generally, the characteristically long time interval between a first wrong side block and a second suggests a sustained 'inoculative' effect of error (i.e. the first error does not seem to reflect a lapse into persistently suboptimal practice).
The free-text attitudes to MBYB indicated a general reluctance to interrupt or slow down the processes just before injection, even when many of those who had performed a wrong side block recognised that 'rushing' had been a predisposing factor. Again, the reasons for this dichotomy would be worth investigating in greater depth. One factor to explore might be possible prevailing institutional cultures in which production pressure outweighs a commitment to safety [11] . Another would be whether safety measures are sufficiently embedded in regional anaesthesia training programmes. Our data do not address these speculations. There is evidence that patients expect compliance with generally accepted, relatively simple safety initiatives such as SBYB [12] . Therefore, the onus falls on those who fail to comply (especially in the face of continuing evidence of repetitions of the same error, as our survey shows), to provide sound reasons and, preferably, a demonstrably better alternative approach [13, 14] . Unfortunately our survey free-text comments were unrevealing in this regard, except for admissions of omission ('. . .I simply forget').
This study suffers the same limitations as any survey. Although the sample size of 208 was justifiable and exceeded the planned minimum, it represented just 40% of the total number of anaesthetists at all the centres combined. We can speculate that the majority of those who did not respond have never experienced a wrong side block (and/or perform few or no blocks) and thus rated responding as a low priority. Some support for this interpretation comes from the fact that our estimated annual incidence for wrong side block from this sample (~156 per year) is higher than that actually reported as Never Events (~54 per year) [2] [3] [4] . Even allowing for the fact that the latter figure applies to England only, whereas our data (using denominator) estimate the incidence across the UK, and allowing for missed reports in NHS England data, our figure does suggest an over-representation of responses from those who have experienced wrong side block. We feel it was an advantage to have been able to capture the views of those who had experienced wrong side block.
We might have increased our sample size by asking anaesthetic nurses and operating department practitioners to contribute. Much of our discussion focuses on anaesthetists alone but in one sense, the conduct of anaesthesia is a two-person task and it would have been interesting to explore the attitudes of assistants engaging with this safety measure.
Another limitation lies in the detail of the questions we might have asked. We would like to have explored in more detail the psychology and attitudes to wrong side blocks and their prevention, but there is typically an inverse relationship between the size of questionnaire and response rate (the greater the former, the smaller the latter). Nevertheless, we were able to gain some insights. Given some recent controversies around how the policy of Never Events is applied in practice [6, 7] we might have expected more opposition to the concept, so we were surprised that views were so evenly divided as to whether to classify wrong side blocks as Never Events. It was also clear that some who had undergone investigations after a wrong side block were deeply affected by their experience ('[the wrong side block] was a major upheaval in my life. . .').
We were also struck that in two centres it appears to be the practice that anaesthetists should make an extra mark or use a locally approved 'stop' sticker (to be placed on the side of block) [15, 16] . The Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group (SALG) and NHS Improvement have previously stressed that no extra marks should be made or placed on the patient other than the surgical site mark (SALG; personal correspondence). Pandit et al. predicted in recent correspondence that this would lead to error [17] . It is well established in cognitive psychology that attending to one visual cue makes another invisible (the 'invisible gorilla' effect) [18] . It was therefore disappointing to learn that soon after our survey closed, SALG had been informed of two Never Events caused by the very sticker designed to prevent wrong side block (personal correspondence). On two occasions (different anaesthesia teams) a team member had erroneously placed the 'stop' sticker on the non-operative side (for understandable reasons, but opposite to the intention of local policy). The surgical site mark had therefore probably become invisible to the anaesthetist (Fig. 4) . There is no policy, either at the affected centre or anywhere else, as to how to respond to a sticker or mark placed on the wrong side. For example, in this situation does the surgical or anaesthetic mark take precedence? And if the former, then why bother at all with the latter?
Generally, methods to prevent error can consist of physical barriers, visual cues/audible alarms or personal behaviours acquired through training. Wrong side block can be prevented by a 'stop' moment, but only if performed just before needle insertion (and not reliably at any time-point before this). Physical barriers risk detracting from the surgical site mark. The visual cue of 'stop' sign wall posters to promote SBYB appear to have had limited impact. This leaves behavioural modifications, of which MBYB is an example. We are not aware that anaesthetists frequently, if ever, forget to insert a canula or to place essential monitoring before conducting regional or neuraxial anaesthesia. Yet, there are no signs to remind them to do so; it just comes naturally, ingrained through training. It is possible to conceive of a similar scenario where MBYB becomes a natural part of the block performance as future anaesthetists become trained to do it.
In our survey, anaesthetists who used free text often highlighted the problems posed by turning patients, including for multiple blocks. We cannot see how physical barriers on ultrasound machines or nerve stimulators [19] or placing additional stickers (Fig. 4) would prevent a wrong side block in these circumstances. One would have to replace the ultrasound barrier each time (assuming that is, that the ultrasound was needed for each of the blocks). For additional stickers, the problem is that there is only one surgical mark to identify the operative side but potentially several blocks to achieve the required analgesia; it is not clear that several stickers will be helpful. However, MBYB will reliably force a stop moment, even in these cases of multiple blocks with changes in position.
In summary, our survey raises questions about the engagement of anaesthetists with SBYB as a safety measure to prevent wrong side blocks. This would be of less concern if alternative safety measures were being used, or if wrong side blocks were unknown, but neither of these things applies. Considerable work is needed to achieve full compliance with SBYB at the correct time, and it highlights the need to develop a universal trigger to stop at the correct time. 'Mock Before You Block' may be one such universal trigger. Figure 4 Mock-up of a problem with using additional marks or stickers, reported at one centre. The 'stop' sticker (red) should have been placed on the same side as the surgical mark (arrow). When placed on the opposite side, selective attention makes the surgical mark invisible, potentially leading to a Never Event.
